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Abstract 
 
Recent cross-country research shows that there is a causal relationship between trade 
liberalization and quality of institutions. The literature on cross-country studies has been 
criticized because differences in legal systems and other institutions across countries are 
difficult to control for. An in-depth case study of a particular country’s experience can 
provide a useful complement to cross-country regressions. Using the unique dataset from 
provincial competitiveness survey and a quasi-natural experiment from joining the World 
Trade Organization, I find that variations in economic institutions across provinces in 
Vietnam can be explained by trade liberalization. To overcome endogeneity problems, I use 
minimum distance from each province to main economic centres as an instrument for trade 
liberalization. The instrumental variable approach shows that the direction of influence is 
from greater openness to better institutions. The results hold after controlling for various 
additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative measures of institutions. I also 
find that trade liberalisation has greater short term impacts on institutional quality in the 
Northern provinces. 
 
JEL classification: F1, O43 
Keywords: Trade liberalization, institutions, Vietnam 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large volume of literature exists on the expected impact of trade liberalization on economic 
growth. In general, there is agreement that trade openness leads to economic growth beyond 
that expected under no policy change1. According to the standard neo-classical model of 
exogenous growth, trade patterns among countries are determined by comparative advantage, 
i.e., where each country maximises its welfare by concentrating on the activities in which it is 
most economically efficient. The gains from trade may be static—such as improvements in 
the allocative efficiency of resources use or dynamic such as imported technology or 
“learning-by-doing” effects. However, in the neoclassical theory, trade liberalisation only 
lead to an increase in the level of income but not the steady-state rate of growth. 
 
Endogenous theory stresses the impact of dynamic efficiency gains as engines of growth. 
Trade policy creates impacts on both level of income and the long-run rate of growth of an 
economy through scale, allocation, spillover and redundancy effects. First, since the potential 
market is expanded, the economies of scale in production can be reaped and thus the 
production of final goods and intermediate goods are concentrated in the most efficient sites. 
Second, allocation effects arise from the resource reallocation leading to the accumulation of 
factors of production such as human, physical capital or R&D. Third, direct investment flows 
are expected to expand. Productivity can be gained from knowledge spillovers as a result of 
the ability to imitate the products of foreign producers or of informational spillovers which 
enables local firms to learn more about market opportunities in foreign locations, improving 
local firms’ export capabilities and enabling new trading relationships and the expansion of 
the number of traded products. Fourth, trade openness leads to the reduction of unnecessary 
duplication of research, eliminating redundancy in R&D (Hale and Long, 2006; Duncan and 
Doan, 2003). 
 
There is a growing consensus among economists that institutions are fundamental to 
determine long run economic performance (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Alesina 
                                                             
1 See for example the seminal papers by Edwards (1998) and Rodrik (1999). Rodrik (1992) discusses the limits of 
trade reforms in developing countries. See also Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000), Harrison and Hanson (1999). Edwards’ 
(1993) survey presents a detailed account of the studies on export growth and economic growth, as well as the 
literature on trade liberalisation and growth. Greenaway and Sapsford (1994) also provide empirical evidence 
regarding the links between trade liberalisation, exports and economic growth in a growth accounting framework. 
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et al., 1996; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002; Rodirk, 
2000a; Rodrik, 2000b; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Easterly and Levine, 2003; 
Dollar and Kraay, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999, 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; 
Acemoglu, 2009). Trade liberalisation now affects economic performance not only through 
changes in relative prices in a mechanical way, but also through a number of institutional 
arrangements. Recent studies have attempted to figure out channels that trade openness 
affects institutional change. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) show that trade associated with 
transfer of skill-biased technology increases the income share of the middle class. This 
increases their political power relative to the rest of the society and they impose checks and 
balances on existing institutions to protect their property rights and contracts.  Rodrik (2000a) 
argues that adoption of trade liberalisation policies has often entailed the importation of 
institutions. Membership of the WTO, for example, requires the adoption of a certain set of 
institutional norms that assist improving domestic institutions.  
 
Trade will increase the costs of excessive regulation and could lead domestic and foreign 
investors to pressure the government to improve institutions. Ades and Di Tella (1999) and 
Treisman (2000) find that trade openness associates negatively with corruption to a 
significant degree. Trade could have a stronger effect on growth in countries with bad 
institutions since it could both encourage regulatory reform and lead to more specialization. 
Other recent work highlights the importance of “sound institutions” in promoting efficient 
resource allocation. This reduces the general costs of doing business, enhances the efficiency 
of resource allocation (Beck and Levine, 2004) and strengthens an economy’s performance 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005). Trade liberalisation is associated with changes in the government’s 
relationship with the private sector and with the rest of the world. Trade liberalisation sets 
new rules and expectations regarding how these policy choices are made and implemented, 
and establishes new constraints and opportunities for economic policy (Bates and Krueger 
1993). 
 
Islam and Montenegro (2002) argue that the more open economy is the better institutions and 
faster economic growth because rent seeking and corruption is harder when there is 
competition among agents. As the number of trading partner increases, better institutions are 
demanded to manage risk that comes from trading with unknown partners. Greater risk and 
greater opportunities work together to break the effectiveness of existing networks and rules, 
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creating demand for more effective institutions. Moreover, agents in open economies learn 
from those in other economies and these forces work to improve institutional quality.  
 
While trade openness does seem to be associated with better institutions in a cross-section of 
countries, various studies have shown that openness has been no guarantee of continued 
institutional improvement. The growth benefit of international trade is evident only when 
combined with complementary reforms in education, regulatory environment and other 
institutions (Bolaky and Freund, 2004). Not surprisingly, then, some researchers question a 
simple positive relationship between openness and institutional development. In general, they 
believes that trade liberalisation has a positive impact on growth, but the positive direction of 
the impact is conditional, and incentives created by price reforms such as in external trade 
and taxation will not work in the absence of appropriate institutions. A well-known example 
is Rodrik (2003), who argues that the empirical relationship between openness and 
institutional development is uncertain. Imported institutions can be ill-suited or 
counterproductive and successful institutional reform requires an adequate combination of 
imported blueprints and local flavour. Do and Levchenko (2009) point out that  international 
trade contributed to concentration of political power in the hands of groups that were 
interested in setting up or perpetuating bad institutions. In other studies, scholars show that 
argue that the impacts of inward FDI on corruption in host countries depend on the host's 
underlying political and economic environments. Economic integration that allows higher 
rents which could possibly be shared between investors and government officials, associating 
with weak institutions to detect bribe payments, can increase the level of corruption (Pinto 
and Zhu, 2009; Zhu, 2009). 
 
Almost all empirical literature on causal relationship between trade openness and institutional 
change has employed cross-country regressions. There are many useful insights have been 
gained from this literature; however, cross-country regressions have been presently 
undesirable on two perspectives. 
 
First, most cross-country analyses of the effect of trade liberalization on institutions use 
measures created by an idiosyncratic weighting of several institutions or categories of 
institutions. These aggregates are often based on subjective perceptions, contain significant 
noise, are suspiciously volatile and are likely to be biased or contaminated by perceptions of a 
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country’s economic performance. Pincus (2009) maintains that governance indicators that 
rely on surveys that record the subjective evaluations of domestic and international 
businesses and citizens do not always reflect the fundamental situations, and averaging many 
different perceptions does not necessarily make the indicators more accurate. Moreover, it 
seems that there has not yet been an attempt to aggregate these measures into more reliable 
synthetic measure of institutions (Jellema and Roland, 2009). 
 
Second, it is generally very difficult to control for differences in cultures, legal systems and 
other institutions that may be relevant for the outcome variable under study. Using dummy or 
inclusion of fixed effects in panel regressions may help. However, the myriad of country-
specific institutions may also interact with the key regressor under investigation to affect the 
outcome variable. In this case, the usual fixed effects are not sufficient to control for the 
influence of the country-specific institutions (Wei and Wu, 2001, Malesky and Taussig, 
2009). 
 
Therefore, it is necessary to supplement cross-country studies by investigating the causal 
relationship between trade openness and institution quality within country. In this context, 
Vietnam is likely to be appropriate test for several reasons. First, the recent accession to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) by Vietnam offers a quasi-natural experiment on the 
consequence of embracing globalization. Before 1990, the country had relatively little trade 
with the rest of the world and almost no foreign direct investment. Since then, the economy 
gradually integrates into the world market and particularly to the WTO in early 2007. 
Economic integration has become the most dynamic component of the Vietnamese economy 
over the last decade (Dang and Baker, 2008). Second, as the central government signs 
bilateral and multilateral agreements with institutional improvements to trade and investment, 
all regions in Vietnam benefit. However, the results of institutional development have been 
uneven across provinces. Some provinces rank at high level and show rapid growth in 
business investment, while others lag behind. Diversity in initial structural conditions, such as 
geography and proximity to markets can explain partly these differences. However, they 
cannot explain substantial differences in ranking score between provinces with similar 
conditions. This variation across space provides a good opportunity to study the impact of 
openness on institutions while holding historical, cultural, political system and government 
structure and a host of other factors constant.  
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Using the unique dataset for 63 provinces in Vietnam, I find that the variation in economic 
institutions within country can be explained by trade liberalization, proxied by disbursed 
foreign direct investment. To address endogeneity concern, I use distance from capital of 
each province to main economic centres as an instrument for the proxy of trade liberalization. 
The results indicate that a higher amount of disbursed foreign direct investment result in a 
better institutional quality. The instrumental variable approach suggests that the direction of 
influence is from greater openness to better institutions. The result holds after controlling for 
various additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative measures of institutions 
such as business environment, human resources, corruption and pro-activity of provincial 
leaders. The results also show that trade liberalization has greater institutional impacts on 
provinces in the North. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
motivation. Section 3 briefly describes the trade liberalization in conjunction with 
institutional changes. Section 4 justifies for data used. Section 5 introduces the empirical 
strategy. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes. 
 
3. Vietnam’s trade liberalization process and institutional changes 
 
Vietnam began to liberalize international trading activities in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
from a position as one of the poorest economies in the world. The full impact of these 
reforms, however, was limited by the incomplete nature of the reforms and by the lack of 
access to the U.S. market, the traditional engine of growth for export-led economies in East 
Asia. As a legacy of the U.S-Vietnam War, conditions in Vietnam and the timing of reforms 
were a decade or more behind those of its East Asian neighbours. 
 
In an effort to integrate into global markets, Vietnam has promoted a policy towards regional 
integration and in this light is committed to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), 
ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), ASEAN-Korea FTA and is negotiating a number of other 
bilateral trade agreements, such as an agreement between ASEAN and Japan, India and 
Australia and New Zealand. Vietnam’s bilateral agreement with the US, signed in 2001 
marked a major effort to liberalise and guarantee a stable trading environment for trade flows 
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between the US and Vietnam. In early 2007, Vietnam officially became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
With regard to the effects of trade liberalization on domestic institutional quality, to a large 
extent, international trade works closely with foreign direct investment. The international 
agreements, especially the BTA and WTO agreements, which had an amazingly deep impact 
not only on traditional trade policy issues, but also on many fundamental rule of law and 
governance, provided a critical benchmark and focus for improving Vietnam’s economic and 
legal institutions to support a market economy and international integration from central to 
local governments. All of these promote and attract more foreign investors.  
 
At the macro levels, all agreements require Vietnam to make major reforms of laws and 
institutions relating to trade in goods and services, intellectual property rights protection, 
treatment of investors, business facilitation, transparency, and the right to appeal 
administrative decisions to the courts. They require improving the legal and judicial systems 
to provide effective means for resolving commercial and administrative disputes and 
protecting property rights administrative and regulatory procedures must be open; and 
businesses and citizens must have the right to protest government decisions through open 
administrative procedures—with due process, written rulings, and ultimately judicial review 
(USAID, 2008).   
 
At the provincial levels, since trade and foreign direct investment are believed as the major 
driving force of budget revenue, economic growth and poverty reduction, local governments 
offer various preferential policies to foreign investors to attract more foreign investment 
(Malesky, 2008). Therefore, foreign direct investment is likely to impact on local economic 
governments through two mechanisms: unanticipated and actual effects. For unanticipated 
effects, to take advantage of integration and potential high flow of foreign investment, 
provinces seek to improve business environment and human resources; reinforce their 
administrative reform. With decentralization in the authority of investment regulation, some 
provinces even provide a variety of extra incentives beyond the ones permitted by the central 
government, ranging from investment premiums and accelerated depreciation to tax holidays 
and reductions of land use fees (Vu et al, 2007). For actual effects, foreign investors force 
local governments to become more transparent and active to reform business environment. 
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With commitment in the trade agreements to provide greater access to foreign providers of 
business, education and labor training services, it would be expected that private sector firms 
should benefit from a greater selection of quality service providers. While the BTA and WTO 
do not provide direct requirements regarding corruption, there is a strong presumption that 
transparency and enhanced appeals procedures will lead to reductions in informal charges. 
Transparency requirements should be expected to significantly improve access by the private 
sector to legal normative documents at the national and provincial levels (Malesky, 2007). 
 
4. Data description 
 
The main variables that we use in this study are: economic governance and disbursed foreign 
direct investment. 
 
Institutional variables 
 
Although the overall importance of institutions for economic development has been 
emphasised in the literature, there is less agreement on how to measure the quality of 
institutions. For cross-country studies, researchers who undertook empirical research on the 
effects of institutions rely on several sources to measure differences in institutional quality 
across countries. Some of the institutional quality measures that have been used in the 
empirical growth literature are the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) expropriation 
risk index (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001); composite ICRG and Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI) indexes (Knack and Keefer, 1995); an index 
combining five ICRG indicators with the Sachs-Warner openness index (Hall and Jones, 
1999); the bureaucratic efficiency, political stability and institutional efficiency indexes 
composed of nine Business International (BI) indicators (Mauro, 1999); and the composite 
ICRG index and the Freedom House democracy index (Rodrik, 1999b). 
 
In this paper, data on institutions are from the Vietnam Provincial Competitiveness Index 
survey (PCI). The PCI is product of a United States Agency for International Development 
project conducted by the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative and the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. The main goal of the PCI is to explain why some provinces 
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experience higher growth and private sector development than others. The primary output of 
the PCI is the Provincial Competitiveness Index, which ranks all provinces by their universal 
regulations. The main index has a possible range of 10-100 and is a weighted combination of 
ten sub-indices with higher values representing better regulations. 
 
These sub-indices, ranging from 1-10, are arranged into three factor groups. The first factor 
contains the three most strongly correlated sub-indices and two others that are generally 
concerned with post-registration policies and regulation in the provincial business 
environment. Transparency, Labor, Pro-activity and Time Costs are related to the local level 
policy initiatives or decisions to implement those policy choices. The second factor uncovers 
a general conception of property rights, including the ability to access and the security of 
business premises (Land Access), the faith firms have that provincial courts will enforce 
contracts (Confidence in Legal Institutions), and firm perceptions of the corruption of 
provincial officials (Informal Charges). These sub-indices explore formal restraints placed on 
the grabbing hand of bureaucrats. Good scores on property rights represent state retreat from 
intervention in the affairs of private firms, as opposed to the first factor, where good scores 
represent policy interventions. The final factor comprises two subindices Entry Costs and 
Bias to the State Sector, which address entry barriers to private entrepreneurs. Entry Costs 
describe the direct financial costs of entry, whereas SOE bias represents the implicit barriers 
to private sector entry posed by the economic strength of the existing state sector or the 
ideological convictions of provincial bureaucrats (Malesky, 2007). 
 
I take the economic governance index in 2007 to investigate short term impact of trade 
liberalization on institutional quality after one year of WTO membership. This index is 
assumed to reflect the effects of trade openness policy in recent years on provincial 
governance performance. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the scores of PCI 2007 
with those of PCI 2005. It is clear that provincial economic governance in Vietnam 
demonstrates a high correlation. The mean score of aggregate PCI 2007 has increased by 0.87 
points over the PCI survey in 2005. Figure 6 shows the spatial variation of institutional levels 
across provinces in 2007. On average, it shows that institutional performances are better in 
southern provinces. In addition, the lowest rankings of economic institutions belong to 
mountainous provinces in the North. 
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Trade policy openness variables 
 
Dowrick and Golley (2004) classify concepts of trade openness into revealed openness and 
policy openness. Revealed openness, which is the ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) 
to GDP, is the measure widely used in empirical studies. It has the advantage of being both 
clearly defined and well measure, although there are differing points of view as to whether 
domestic or international prices should be used to value trade ratio (Rodrik et al., 2002). 
Studies using revealed openness address the question of whether countries that engage in 
more foreign trade have better economic performance to countries that trade less. One of the 
disadvantages of this measure is that it does not explain why some countries might trade 
more. In addition, a high trade ratio is likely to result from some combination of policy 
openness, easy access to foreign market and small internal market. 
 
Trade policy openness is used to capture a range of policies that explain why some countries 
trade more than other. However, measurement of policy openness also confronts with 
difficulties. In a comprehensive survey of policy openness ranging from incidence measures 
of trade barriers (the frequency of non-tariff barriers and the average tariff level), to trade 
flow measures adjusted for structural characteristics (size and endowments), to measures of 
price distortion, Pritchett (1996) discusses the problem associated with all of these measures. 
He finds that the most commonly used measures are uncorrelated with each other, making it 
difficult to find a reliable measure of policy openness. 
 
In another effort, Sachs and Warner (1995) seek to define policy openness and estimate its 
impacts on economic performance. They analyse the presumed linkage between openness and 
growth performance for 79 countries for the period 1970 – 1989. They construct a binary 
openness index of five indicators, which reflect various policy variables that influence the 
openness of an economy. An economy is closed if one or more of the following conditions 
are given: (i) Its average tariff rate on imports of capital or intermediate goods is above 40 
percent; (ii) Its non tariff barriers cover 40 percent or more of its import of capital and 
intermediate goods; (iii) Its black market premium is 20 percent or more; (iv) It has a socialist 
economic system; (v) It has a state monopoly on major exports.  
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The Sachs-Warner study has two weaknesses. First, the binary representation of openness is 
not satisfying. The idea of openness suggests gradual differences over time and between 
countries, and therefore a continuous index would be preferable. Second, the combined 
Sachs-Warner index blurs the effect of trade policy on economic growth. Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2001) argue that only two of the five indicators, the tariff rate and the coverage of 
quantitative import restrictions, are acceptable indicators of trade policy. The other three 
indicators, the black market premium on foreign exchange, the state monopoly for major 
exports, and the classification as a socialist country, reflect policies and institutional 
characteristics that have nothing to do with trade policy. 
 
For the case of Vietnam, these above measures are likely not to be appropriate to be proxy for 
trade policy openness at provincial level. First, tariff and non-tariff barriers, price distortion 
and Sachs-Warner indexes are most suitable for cross-country studies as they measure 
macroeconomic performance, not relevant at province levels. Second, other proxies such as 
export growth and trade share all are subject to some biases in measurement. Trade volumes 
by provinces are likely to be double counted, that may overestimate trade figures across 
provinces and bias our inference. Moreover, if measurement errors are systematic in the 
direction that every province reports substantial high growth rate, there are likely not enough 
variation in interested variables. Third, it is expected that trade turnover cannot create 
significant impacts on provincial economic governance in the short run. 
 
Therefore, I use the amount of disbursed FDI as a proxy for trade policy openness in 
provinces. The FDI index is calculated by averaging disbursed FDI over two years from 
2006-07. This period is chosen because it allows looking at the impact of trade openness on 
foreign investment one year before and after becoming a member of the WTO with many 
expected institutional reforms.  
 
There are some reasons that justify for using disbursed foreign direct investment as a 
measurement of trade openness policies across provinces. First, Figure 4 shows that in the 
period of 2000 – 2007, the growth rate of export keeps stable at an average rate of 22 per cent 
per annum even Vietnam is expected to be gain significant benefit from joining the WTO and 
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to some extent from post-trade agreement with the US2. Second, in structure of Vietnamese 
export, primary products3 account for nearly 48 per cent of export volumes which are rather 
inelastic with the world demand and not likely to be impacted significantly by bilateral and 
multilateral agreements as shown by Figure 5. In contrast, Figure 7 indicates a dramatic 
increase in registered foreign direct investment from around 3 billion USD in 2001 to more 
than 21 billion USD in 2007. The disbursed FDI also increases significantly from 2.4 billion 
in 2001 to 4.6 billion in 2007. As mentioned above, Vietnam’s trade liberalization is a 
comprehensive trade agreement with investment plays an important role. The integration 
process goes along with the implementation of agreements on institutional improvements. 
These include improving transparency by requiring publication of regulations before their 
effectiveness, reforming court procedures to make the court more independent and effective, 
improving the arbitration process, modernizing contract law, reforming legal and banking 
services, and implementing transactions-based customs procedures. All of which create more 
transparent investment environment which attract more attention from foreign investors. 
Investors have viewed WTO membership as not only offering wider investment 
opportunities, but have also been comforted by the predictability and “lock-in” to policy 
reforms that it entails (Dang and Baker, 2008).  
 
Other data on the number of telephone and real GDP per 1,000 citizens are taken from 
Vietnam's Statistical Yearbook. The data on inequality and public sector education is 
calculated from Vietnam Living Standard Survey 2006. The budget transfer per 
100,000citizens data is from the website of Ministry of Finance. The descriptive statistics of 
and the correlation matrix among explanatory variables are represented in Appendix. 
 
5. Econometric model 
 
To uncover the relationship between trade liberalization and institutions within a country I 
estimate an equation of the form: 
 
                                                             
2 One counter-argument is if not signing of bilateral trade agreement trade with the US, Vietnam is unable to 
maintain the export growth rate at double digits at early 2000s after the impacts of Asian financial crisis. 
However, this argument is likely to overestimate the BTA’s impacts since the US market only accounts for less 
than 20 per cent of the total exports. 
3 Primary products include raw mineral and agricultural and forestry commodities. 
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where INSi07 is a measure of institutional quality in province i in 2007, Tradepoi06-07 is trade 
openness policy measured by average disbursed FDI in 2006-07, and X06-07 is a vector of 
other control variables. INSi05 controls for historical factors that cause impact of the local 
institutions in previous periods and may have the same affect on later institutional quality in 
each province.  
 
We expect coefficient of trade openness policy to be positive and statistically significant. 
However it is not straightforward to interpret it as a causal effect. There are challenges of 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias that we need to address to interpret 1 as a causal effect. 
First, endogeneity or reverse causality can lead to bias in our estimates. We argue that trade 
liberalization improves institutional quality. However it is also possible that causality runs in 
the opposite direction. For instance, foreign capital is more likely to flow to province with 
good business environment. Therefore, the direction of causality is likely to go from 
institutional changes to higher foreign direct investment. Second, some unobserved factors 
may affect both the decisions of investors and governance quality, resulting in correlation 
between the two but nothing to do with a direct causal relationship. We are arguing here that 
trade liberalization improves institutional quality. However it is also possible that province 
specific unobservable factors such as history, culture, ethnic makeup, religion and geography 
or other local policies may influence both institutions and foreign direct investment. This will 
also bias our estimates. Measurement error is another concern and can lead to bias and 
inconsistency in our estimates. 
 
To address the problem of omitted variable bias and measurement error, I estimate the model 
using the two-step efficient Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in the two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) estimation. One advantage of GMM-IV is to exploit the optimal weighting 
matrix of the orthogonality conditions to allow for efficient estimation in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity with unknown form. Therefore, this adds efficiency gains of this estimator 
relative to the traditional IV-2SLS estimator   (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2003). 
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An instrumental variable has to satisfy the twin conditions that it is (highly) correlated with 
the suspected endogenous variables but contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term 
in the levels regression. Moreover, the instrument cannot have direct effects on the dependent 
variable. Recent studies have proposed different variables to instrument for foreign 
investment flows such as predicted exchange rate (Malesky, 2009); distance from the border 
(Jensen & Rosas, 2007); weighted average of the geographical distance between the host 
country and the richest economies in the world as an instrument for trade and investment 
(Pablo and Zhu, 2008). 
 
To construct instrument for trade openness policy at province level, I follow the technique 
that has been employed by Irwin and Tervio (2000) and Wei and Wu (2001) using log 
minimum distance to main economic centers. 
 
The basic idea is foreign direct investment in each province is related to its geography (e.g. 
proximity to major economic centers), but its geography is unlikely to be influenced by its 
institutions. In this case, I take advantage of the special geographic features of the 
Vietnamese territory to construct an instrumental variable for province’s openness. I observe 
that a different degree of foreign investment reflects largely a different degree of access to 
major economic centers. Provinces that are far away from economics centers are likely to 
have lower registered and disbursed FDI. FDI projects that take advantage of economic scale 
tend to be located near well-developed cosmopolitan areas such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh 
City (HCMC).  There are many benefits that the projects which are close to Hanoi and 
HCMC can gain. First, it is convenient to gain access to international markets as the two 
cities possess or in close proximity to the dynamic airports and seaports in the country. 
Second, it reduces the cost and complexity of domestic and international travel. Third, FDI 
projects located in or near Hanoi, HCMC and neighboring provinces, obtain positive 
agglomeration effects with investors cluster near other investors to benefit from vertical 
linkages (Vu et al, 2009). Actually, Ho Chi Minh City and its surrounding area receive more 
than two-thirds of all FDI while the Red River Delta (Hanoi and its region) receives 20 per 
cent of the total. All in all, the country’s two leading economic regions attract some 85 per 
cent of total disbursed foreign investment. 
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I note that while Hanoi and Hochiminh city are the top two economic centers in Vietnam, 
they certainly do not cover all foreign direct investment (Figure 2). For provinces in the 
central region, the minimum distance from the economic center in this region may be a more 
relevant determinant for their disbursement of FDI. The biggest economic center in this area 
is Danang. 
 
With these observations in mind, I use the road distance from a province capital to either 
Hanoi, Danang or Hochiminh city, whichever is smaller, as the instrumental variable 
(together with other regressors in the main regression) for openness for that province. To be 
more precise, assume d(k, Hanoi) [or d(k, Hochiminh) or d(k, Danang)] is the distance 
between province k and Hanoi (or Hochiminh city or Danang), then, the instrumental variable 
for province k is 
 
D(k) = min {log[d(k, Hanoi)], log[d(k, Hochiminh city)], log[d(k, Danang)]} 
 
Then Hanoi, Hochiminh and Danang are dropped from the regressions as we want to avoid 
the problem of having to define the distance for any of these three cities to itself. 
 
The instrumental variable estimation method can be summarized as follows. At the first stage 
I estimate equations (2) and use the predicted values of trade liberalization to estimate 
equation (1). If the instrument is valid, the IV strategy will solve the omitted variables bias 
and measurement error problems, and I can estimate the 1  parameters consistently. 
 
iii DISTTradepo   )ln(10706  (2) 
 
The bivariate correlation between the instrument and trade liberalization is 0.53 which is 
statistically significant at five per cent. Figure 3 represent the relationship between economic 
integration and geographic closeness with the closer a province is to the main economic 
centres, the more inward FDI it has.  
 
Potential Violations of the Exclusion Restriction 
 
16 
 
A remaining econometric concern is whether the instrumental variable violates the exclusion 
restriction in the sense that distance to main economic centers has an independent impact on 
institutions beyond any effects working through FDI (conditional on other control variables).  
Many of omitted observed and unobserved deep factors such as culture, ethnicity, climate or 
local policies influencing disbursed FDI can be correlated with institutions. This has the 
potential of causing omitted variable bias. IV strategy allows us to eliminate the influence of 
these factors. Of course there are other variables which can correlate with distance and 
influence institutions. Some of the obvious ones are infrastructure, inequality, education, 
budget transfer and real GDP per capita4. I try to control for them as a robustness check. 
However, we can never be sure that we have adequately controlled for all the omitted factors. 
 
One mechanism through which D(k) might plausibly be correlated with error term is through 
education. Provinces near major economic centers have higher level of concentration of 
colleges and university and also attract more high quality labor working in the public sector. 
Glaeser et al. (2004) show that schooling positively influences institutional quality. To 
account for this, I use the average year of schooling of people working in the state sector in 
each province to control for education. 
 
Provinces far away from Hanoi, Hochiminh and Danang have less favorable infrastructure 
conditions than other provinces near three economic centers. A highly developed 
transportation network supported by airports, seaports, railroads and highways helps to 
increase accessibility and decrease the cost of transportation for investors. Therefore, 
provinces with infrastructure at the beginning of the period are likely to attract more FDI. 
However, it is also possible that initial conditions may affect the policy selection of 
provincial leaders. Leaders of provinces with a good infrastructure tend to make pro-investor 
policies, whereas leaders of province with poor infrastructure would have no such ideas 
(Shirk, 1994; Zweig, 2002; Cai and Treiman, 2005; Malesky, 2008). To account for this, I 
use the number of telephone subscribers per capita as a proxy to control for the effects of 
infrastructure. 
 
                                                             
4 Percentage of ethnic minority is possible to correlate with distance to main economic centres and impacts on 
economic institutions. However, this factor is expected to indirectly affect economic institutions through quality 
of education.  
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It is open debate whether southern provinces had a special advantage in leading the reform 
agenda and attracting investment. They benefited from a southern legacy of market 
mechanism (Malesky, 2008). Before 1975, the South followed a market-oriented economy. 
When the country is unified in 1975, the central planning economy is applied in the whole 
country. Because centrally planned system is only implemented in the South for 11 years 
(between 1975 and 1986), as opposed to 32 years (1954-1986) in the northern provinces, and 
since key components of a central planning economy such as the collectivization of land and 
agriculture are never fully implemented in the South, southern provinces have a enormous 
advantage at developing streamlined economic governance after the beginning of economic 
reforms (Dinh, 2009). To capture the unique characteristics of the South and its potential 
correlation with distance to main economic centres, I control a dummy variable based on 
whether a province was located north or south of the 1954 Geneva Armistice’s border 
declaration at the 17th Parallel. 
 
Vietnam has managed to transfer a great deal of wealth from the most developed provinces to 
the least ones over the course of the reform era. Only eleven provinces have routinely run 
fiscal surpluses in 2006-2007. Together they account for about 73 per cent of national 
revenue5. On the other hand, 52 provinces have been frequent recipients of balance transfers 
from the central government. Poor provinces in northeast, northwest and central highland 
receive a large amount of subsidies. Malesky and Taussig (2009) argue that these poorly 
endowed provinces looked to the central government for transfers, rather than exploring 
independent reform strategies or attempting to converge to the successful strategies of other 
the high-flying provinces. Therefore, to control for possible correlation between distance to 
main economic centers to budget transfer, I include the average budget transfer per 100.000 
citizens over the period 2006-07. 
 
Provinces near main economic centers grow faster than other one with less favorable 
infrastructure conditions. Barro (1997) and Lipset (1959) agrue that institutional development 
associates with economic growth. In addition, provinces with higher economic growth tend to 
have a wider gap of income inequality. There are some evidences showing that inequality has 
a negative effect on institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Jong-sung and Khagram, 
                                                             
5 They include QuangNinh, Hanoi, HaiPhong, VinhPhuc, HoChiMinh City, DaNang, KhanhHoa, DongNai, 
BRVT, CanTho and BinhDuong 
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2005). I control real income per capita and GINI as a proxy for growth and inequality, 
respectively, to check robustness of the instrumental variable. 
 
A more serious concern is that the minimum distance to main economic centers is likely to 
have direct effects on provincial institutions through regional policy diffusion (Simmons and 
Elkin, 2004; Tiebout, 1956). Provinces can exchange ideas and replicate the model of 
economic governance from neighboring ones. It is expected that policy ideas should spread to 
neighboring provinces and should diffuse more rapidly across provinces of similar 
geography, climate and topology (Malesky, 2008). Adding the dummy variable for provinces 
in the North and South partly captures this effect. To further investigate this potential direct 
relationship, I firstly correlate minimum distance to main economic centers with economic 
governance indices of provinces in Southeast, Southcentral Coast and Red River Delta. The 
results show that only provinces in Red River Delta are statistically significant at five per 
cent. However, I first add dummy variables to control for policy diffusion in the regression 
and implement another formal test later to check sensitivity. 
 
6. Evidence 
 
This section systematically tests whether trade liberalization leads to institutional 
development. I start correlating foreign direct investment with institutions using OLS. I find 
that proxy of trade liberalization policy impacts positively institutions. The estimated 
magnitudes of the relationship between disbursed FDI and institutions are not only 
statistically significant but also economically meaningful. Calculating the standardized beta 
coefficients of the estimates, I find that ten percent increase in foreign investment per 
100,000 citizens is associated with 0.105 point increase in institution index. However, as 
including lagged dependent variables into the regression, the estimate drops dramatically and 
becomes statistically insignificant to 0.018. One possible explanation is including lagged 
dependent variable (LDV) often biases the coefficients of other variables toward negligible 
values. That may happens when exogenous variables are highly serial correlation and heavily 
trended. In addition, because of that reason, coefficient values of LDVs are often grossly 
inflated (Achen, 2002). Moreover, the estimate is also likely to be biased and inconsistent as 
OLS does not adequately account for measurement error or omitted variable problems. 
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To deal with these above problems, I use GMM-2SLS regression model with the instrument 
constructed. In the first stage regression, the instrument strongly predicts the provincial levels 
of trade liberalization. The F-statistics of the excluded instrument is well above 10 showing 
that the instrument is strong (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
 
The IV estimates are reported in Table 3. The first column reports estimates only control for 
initial condition in 2006 and without control other variables. From column (2), I use 
additional covariates to check robustness of exclusion conditions. The result of a positive and 
statistically significant effect of liberalization on institutions is robust to the inclusion of 
inequality, schooling, budget transfer, real GDP per capita, South dummy and infrastructure 
variables. The results are significant as I either add one by one or simultaneously include all 
control variables. On average, ten percent increase in foreign investment per 100,000 citizens 
is associated with 0.14 – 0.17 point increase in the index of institutional quality. Moreover,  
although I am unable to rule out the possibility that distance could have some independent 
impact on local institutions beyond its impact working through capital flow, the results 
indicate that these other effects are likely to be minor. 
 
I put the results under further scrutiny. Because the impacts of trade liberalization on 
economic governance are not homogenous across provinces, I check whether our result is 
driven by any particular group of provinces. I omit provinces that may be different from the 
rest of the sample to see if this influences the results. The first row of Table 4 reports the 
result with full sample. I re-estimate the regression with two sub-samples, one for Northern 
provinces without northeast and northwest provinces and another for Southern ones. It is 
often argued that provinces in the South have economic governance better than those of the 
North due to legacy of market-orientation. The results indicate that the impacts of trade 
liberalization more profound in the North than the South. In the fourth row, I report the 
results when provinces in northeast, central highland and northwest regions are omitted from 
the sample. Since these provinces are mountainous and poor infrastructure, they almost 
cannot attract foreign direct investment. Therefore, the impacts of foreign investment on 
institutional quality are likely to be negligible. Since foreign direct investment mainly 
concentrates on Southeast, Red River Delta and South Central Coast, I re-estimate the model 
only with provinces in these three regions. Overall, the results remain robust to this procedure 
and support the arguments that trade openness mainly on concentrated regions. However, as I 
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only examine provinces in South Central Coast, Mekong Delta and Southeast, the coefficient 
drops significantly and becomes insignificant. One possible explanation is that these Southern 
provinces, which attract substantial investment in the past, still maintain good economic 
governance which supports private investment environment. Therefore, the impacts of joining 
WTO do not result in a significant improvement in institutional quality in the short term. 
 
To look at more detail the impact of trade liberalization on current level of institutional 
development, I unbundle the impact of trade openness with different measure of economic 
governance. I correlate proxy of trade openness index with subgroup measures of institutions 
using GMM-IV method. There are several PCI indicators which are likely to provide some 
insight into how the economic governance has been affected by BTA/WTO-related reforms 
over the last several years. Table 5 reports the results of regressions estimated with different 
measures of institutional quality used as the dependent variable without controls. All other 
control variables are included and the results are represented in Table 6.  
 
The results show that trade liberalization creates positive impacts on improvement of labour 
training, pro-activity of provincial leadership, private business development, confidence in 
legal institutions and reduction of informal charges. For example, ten percent increase in 
foreign investment per 100,000 citizens lead to corresponding 0.02 points increase in the 
institutional score for pro-activity of provincial leadership and 0.027 points improvement in 
private business development. Trade openness policies also create a catalyst to prevent 
corruption. On average, institutional index on informal charge rise by 0.016 points with ten 
percent increase in foreign direct investment. I also implement a separated estimation for 
provinces in the North. The results demonstrate that trade liberalization have greater positive 
impacts on labour training. 
 
The striking feature of this institutional dataset is that it combines information about informal 
aspects of institutional setting which allows examining more accuracy the impacts of trade 
liberalization on institutional quality. However, this dataset faces the problem as indicated by 
Glaeser et al. (2004) and Rodrik (2004): these indicators are likely to measure investor’s 
perceptions rather than any of formal aspects of economic institutions. They are likely to 
represent institutional outcomes rather than economic institutions itself. In addition, Rodrik 
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(2004) suggests that these perceptions are likely to result from not only the actual operation 
of the institutional environment but also from many other aspects of the economic 
environment. Therefore, to test robustness, I replicate the analysis with only hard indicators 
that are not derived from the survey and less subject to the biases of individual respondents 
across different provinces. However, I have only four out of ten hard indicators that can be 
proxies for those above indices, including: (i) share of liability/revenue of state-owned 
enterprises as proxy of SOEs bias (ii) number of locally managed vocational schools per 
10,000 citizens to measure labor policy; (iii) trade fairs held by province in previous year and 
registered for present year as a proxy for private sector development policies and (iv) 
percentage of legal case filed by private firms measuring private sector confidence in legal 
institutions. The results in Table 7 confirm our above results that only the proxy for trade fair 
is statistically significant as I control for all variables. The results also indicate that trade 
liberalization result in better effects on labour training on Northern provinces6. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis of Potential Violation of Exclusion Restriction 
 
As mentioned, a valid instrument has to satisfy exclusion restriction assumption that requires 
that it impacts the dependent variable only through the endogenous variable. However, this 
assumption is not testable. In our case, if geographic closeness influences economic 
governance directly, this assumption is violated. As discussed before, there are reasons to 
believe that provinces can imitate policies from neighbours to create a cluster of provinces 
with similar policy system.  
 
In this section, I report results from the bounds approach developed by Conley, Hansen, and 
Rossi (2008) to check potential violation of the exclusion restriction assumption. The model 
can be represented in a form as: 
 
  WZXY    (1) 
  WZX           (2) 
 
                                                             
6 Another concern is the response of local government is likely to result from other factors, such as policies of 
central governments rather than the effects of expected higher capital flow. I assume that in the short period of 
time, local governments suffer a common treatment from central governments and the main shock is the impacts 
of increasing flow of foreign direct investment. 
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where Y is vector of outcome, X is vector of endogenous variable, 0)( XE  and Z is 
(excluded) instruments for endogenous variables of X, 0)( ZE . W is predetermined or 
exogenous variables. The difference in this model with normal IV setup is the term, Z, does 
not appear in equation (1). If exclusion restriction assumption holds, then  = 0 and we can 
estimate the two equations using normal GMM-2SLS regression.  
 
If exclusion restriction assumption is violated then 0 . Based on these two equations, we 
can conduct some sensitivity analysis using the prior knowledge about the magnitude of   
and check to what extent the coefficient of foreign investment is still positive within certain 
confidence interval. 
 
In our case, we have reasons to believe that even if 0 , it should be small. If we knew that 
the true value of   is 0 , we could consistently estimate   from  
 
  WXZY )(  
 
with 2SLS using Z as instruments for X. However, since we do not know 0 , we can perform 
sensitivity analysis by studying the implications of different assumptions about its values. 
Conley et al. suggest that we can assume some specific support interval ];[   for >0 and 
estimate the union of confidence intervals for   given any in that support.  
 
I arbitrarily select several of intervals with   = 0.2; 0.4 and 0.6. The maximum value, 0.6, 
approximates to 30 per cent of the foreign investment coefficient in IV model. The estimated 
bounds are reported for 95 percent confidence intervals in Table 8. 
 
The results show that the estimated bounds do not vary significantly with the value of . 
Moreover, none of the 95 percent confidence intervals contain zero. This shows strong 
evidence in favour of robust positive impacts of disbursed foreign investment on the 
economic governance. It is confirming that even if we allow for non-zero level direct 
geographic distance to affect economic governance directly and then remove this part of 
influence of the instrument, the fundamental conclusion that foreign investment improves 
23 
 
institutional quality remains unchanged. Even if the most cautious case, one per cent increase 
in foreign direct investment per 100,000 citizens still increases economic governance 
substantially, by 0.012 standard points. It also indicates that regression results are robust. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I demonstrate the short term impacts of globalization on institutional quality 
across Vietnam’s provinces. Using data on sixty three provinces, the paper has documented a 
positive association between institution and trade openness policy. In particular, provinces 
that have had a greater amount of disbursed foreign direct investment also witness a better 
institutional quality. The instrumental variable approach suggests that the direction of 
influence is from greater openness to better institutions. The result holds after controlling for 
various additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative measures of institutions 
and different samples. The results also show that trade liberalization has greater institutional 
impacts on provinces in the North compared to the overall national performance.  
 
This paper provides a useful complement to studies based on cross-country regressions. The 
results indicate that developing country can use trade liberalization as a catalyst for domestic 
institutional reform and as a promotion of convergence of institutional quality across regions. 
However, the Vietnamese experience of trade liberalization does not necessarily imply that 
the effect of openness policies on institutional quality should be the same in other countries. 
Difference in institutions and government policies could matter. It would be very useful to 
undertake similar case studies for other countries to better understand the channel through 
which globalization impacts on institutions. 
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Appendix I 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean SE Min Max 
Provincial competitive Index 2007  63 53.45 7.92 36.39 72.18 
Provincial competitive Index 2005 63 52.12 7.03 36.67 76.23 
Log average foreign direct investment per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 63 -2.77 2.51 -7.61 2.34 
Log distance to main economic centers 60 4.95 0.78 2.56 6.07 
Log real average GDP per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 63 2.23 0.54 1.34 4.88 
Average Year of schooling of public sector 2006 63 12.87 0.92 10.33 15.30 
Log budget transfer per 100,000 citizens 63 6.65 0.92 3.81 8.34 
Inequality (GINI) 2006 63 0.32 0.04 0.24 0.43 
Log average telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 63 -2.12 0.42 -2.9 -0.61 
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Figure 2. Regional Distribution of Disbursed Foreign Direct Investment 2006-07 
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Figure 3. Relationship between disbursed FDI and Distance to nearest economic centers 
VinhPhuc
DongNai
BinhDuong
BacNinh
QuangNam
LongAn
BacGiangThaiNguyen
PhuTho
TienGiang
HaiDuong
HungYen
BenTre
HaNam
BRVT
Hoa Binh
TayNinh
HaiPhong
BinhPhuoc
TT-Hue
TuyenQuang
NamDinhThaiBiNinh inh
VinhLong
BacKan
TraVinh
QuangNgai
YenBai
DongThap
QuangNinh
ThanhHoa
LangSon
C Tho
QuangTri
AnGiang
BinhThuan
HauGiang
DakNong
SocTrang
CaoBang
KienGiang
HaGiang
BacLieu
QuangBinh
SonLa
LamDong
NgheAn
LaoCai
KonTum
CaMau
BinhDinh
NinhThuan
DakLak
HaTinh
GiaLai
Lai Chau
PhuYen
KhanhHoa
DienBien
-5
0
5
A
ve
ar
ge
 fo
re
ig
n 
di
re
ct
 in
ve
st
m
en
t o
ve
r p
op
ul
at
io
n 
20
06
-2
00
7
-2 -1 0 1
Distance to nearest main economic centers
coef = -1.6541479, (robust) se = .30484012, t = -5.43
 
Figure 4. Growth rate of Import and Export over 2001 - 2008 
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Figure 5.  Exports by commodity group 
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Table 2. Bivariate correlation 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Provincial competitive Index 2007 1       
2. Log average foreign direct investment 
per 1,000 citizens 2006-07 0.334* 1      
3. Log distance to main economic 
centers -0.498* -0.528* 1     
4. Log real average GDP per 1,000 
citizens 2006-07 0.44* 0.489* -0.308* 1    
5. Average Year of schooling of public 
sector 0.315* 0.318* -0.391* 0.417* 1   
6. Log budget transfer per 100,000 
citizens -0.613* -0.468* 0.502* -0.746* -0.466* 1  
7. Log average telephone per 1,000 
citizens 2006-07 0.339* 0.544* -0.34* 0.727* 0.476* -0.626* 1 
* Significant at .05 level 
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Figure 6. Ranking of Provincial Economic Governance 2007 
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Table 3. IV Regressions 
 IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Second Stage. Provincial Competitiveness Index 2007 
Log (FDI/pop) 1.430** 1.421* 1.528* 1.201 1.741** 1.522** 1.504** 1.736*** 
 [0.687] [0.799] [0.797] [0.788] [0.809] [0.718] [0.671] [0.611] 
F-stat 32.05 28.09 18.45 20.66 12.34 11.36 14.39 14.52 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
First Stage. Dependent variable is average foreign direct investment over population 2006-2007 
Log distance -1.49*** -1.34*** -1.37*** -1.39*** -1.43*** -1.52*** -1.53*** -1.51*** 
 [0.341] [0.341] [0.346] [0.390] [0.382] [0.377] [0.349] [0.380] 
PCI 2006 0.042 0.014 0.017 0.02 0.019 0.013 0.016 0.005 
 [0.042] [0.043] [0.045] [0.046] [0.047] [0.047] [0.044] [0.045] 
Log GDP   1.330*** 1.358*** 1.455*** 1.423*** 1.331** 0.615 0.384 
  [0.360] [0.351] [0.449] [0.505] [0.520] [0.590] [0.615] 
Public Schooling   -0.092 -0.084 -0.075 -0.003 -0.088 -0.088 
   [0.282] [0.290] [0.294] [0.301] [0.330] [0.314] 
Budget transfer    0.099 0.139 0.161 0.446 0.487 
    [0.483] [0.474] [0.465] [0.473] [0.475] 
South     0.158 0.148 0.49 -0.193 
     [0.567] [0.574] [0.593] [0.782] 
Inequality      6.976 5.159 4.15 
      [6.948] [6.404] [5.847] 
Log telephone        2.324* 1.888 
       [1.324] [1.338] 
Red River Delta Dummy        0.214 
        [0.809] 
South Central Coast Dummy        2.247*** 
        [0.812] 
Southeast Dummy        2.255** 
        [0.972] 
F-stat 17.98 19.07 15.69 13.09 11.41 10.47 8.7 9.13 
F test for excluded IVs 19.152 15.425 15.531 12.652 13.947 16.161 19.078 15.781 
Stock-Yogo critical values: 5.53/16.38        
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Robust 
standard errors to heteroskedasticity are in the square brackets.  F statistics on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also 
reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent 
significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV 
size. The null hypothesis of weak instruments is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-
Yogo critical values. 
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Table 4. Institutions and trade openness policy: Robustness to subsamples. Dependent variable is 
provincial competitiveness index 2007 
Sample coef SE N 
Full 1.736*** 0.611 60 
Only South 1.698** 0.763 31 
Only North (excluded Northeast and Northwest) 2.548*** 0.846 15 
Excluded Northeast, Northwest and Central Highland 2.290*** 0.674 41 
Only Southeast, Read River Delta and South Central Coast 3.028** 1.493 23 
Only South Central Coast and Southeast 1.142 1.209 13 
Only Southeast and Mekong Delta 1.186 1.130 18 
Only Southeast, South Central Coast and Mekong Delta 1.766** 0.827 25 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Robust 
standard errors to heteroskedasticity. Other control variables include: provincial competitiveness index 2006, average income 
per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, public sector education, average number of telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, average budget 
transfer per 100,000 citizens 2006-07 and inequality 2006, dummy variables for Red River Delta, South Central Coast and 
South East regions. 
 
 
Figure 7. FDI inflows into Vietnam during 1996-2008 
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Table 5. Trade openness policy and different institutional measures. Without control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Regulation in business environment Property rights  Accountability 
 Full Sample 
Dependent Variable Entry Cost Bias to the 
State 
Sector 
Labor 
training 
Proactivity 
of Provincial 
Leadership 
Private 
Business 
Development 
Time Costs of 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
Land Access 
and Security 
of tenure 
Confidence 
in Legal 
Institutions 
Informal 
Charges 
(corruption) 
Transparency 
of business 
information 
Log (FDI/pop) -0.036 0.04 0.290** 0.095 0.267** 0.248*** 0.031 0.224* 0.180*** 0.188* 
 [0.058] [0.044] [0.126] [0.076] [0.108] [0.076] [0.051] [0.120] [0.054] [0.099] 
F-stat 1.65 22.99 15.94 48.52 20.67 8.15 15.23 1.66 7.43 9.38 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
F test of excluded IV 31.321 28.181 16.611 24.584 24.456 31.99 28.233 24.408 28.092 26.851 
 Only North provinces  
Log (FDI/pop) -0.145 0.057 0.519*** 0.063 0.294* 0.268** 0.007 0.17 0.227*** 0.145 
 [0.116] [0.072] [0.178] [0.133] [0.173] [0.121] [0.072] [0.121] [0.076] [0.172] 
F-stat 1.65 4.38 9.84 22.7 9.36 3.51 4.59 0.89 5.4 2.67 
F test of excluded IV 22.462 38.201 12.616 12.347 13.38 24.305 24.014 24.792 27.543 16.236 
Number obs. 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative.  Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. F statistics 
on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent 
significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size (5.53/16.38). The null hypothesis of weak 
instrument is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 6. Trade openness policy and different institutional measures. Adding control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Regulation in business environment Property rights Accountability 
 Full Sample 
Dependent Variable Entry Cost Bias to the 
State 
Sector 
Labor 
training 
Proactivity 
of Provincial 
Leadership 
Private 
Business 
Development 
Time Costs of 
Regulatory 
Compliance 
Land Access 
and Security 
of tenure 
Confidence 
in Legal 
Institutions 
Informal 
Charges 
(corruption) 
Transparency 
of business 
information 
Log (FDI/pop) 0.001 0.074 0.229* 0.219** 0.271*** 0.007 0.023 0.404** 0.157*** 0.148 
 [0.088] [0.055] [0.124] [0.092] [0.098] [0.111] [0.056] [0.171] [0.060] [0.136] 
F-stat 1.63 6.26 11.68 11.11 14.65 7.58 10.57 1.77 3.3 4.91 
F stat for excluded IV 17.794 17.085 12.048 17.044 17.379 16.682 17.29 13.803 16.425 17.668 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 Only Northern provinces 
Log (FDI/pop) -0.097 -0.028 0.444** 0.069 0.202* -0.152 0.039 0.171 0.074 -0.165 
 [0.127] [0.089] [0.202] [0.151] [0.105] [0.160] [0.075] [0.175] [0.057] [0.166] 
F-stat 1 1.04 3.31 5.87 11.36 7.07 5.37 0.55 8.38 6.61 
F stat for excluded IV 14.693 13.542 8.142 12.281 12.522 15.618 15.274 19.28 15.322 11.015 
Number obs. 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. Other 
control variables include: subgroup indices 2006, average income per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, public sector education, average number of telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-
07, average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens 2006-07 and inequality 2006, dummy variables for Red River Delta, South Central Coast and South East regions. F statistics 
on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent 
significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size (5.53/16.38). The null hypothesis of weak 
instrument is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 7. Trade openness policy and different institutional measures. Hard indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full Sample without controls 
Dependent Variable SOEs share of 
liability/revenue 
Trade fair Vocational 
Training 
Cases of non-state 
entities filed by 
courts 
Log (FDI/pop)  0.034 0.112** 0.061 0.084 
 [0.027] [0.045] [0.044] [0.078] 
F-stat 6.84 2.96 16.75 3.36 
F statistics for excluded IV 27.858 30.005 22.493 25.97 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 
 Full Sample with other controls 
Log (FDI/pop)  0.017 0.115* 0.061 0.136 
 [0.020] [0.060] [0.055] [0.083] 
F-stat 9.23 1.1 6.51 1.43 
F statistics for excluded IV 15.549 17.502 13.93 22.839 
Number obs. 60 60 60 60 
 Only Northern provinces with other controls 
Log (FDI/pop)  0.032 0.258*** 0.231* 0.046 
 [0.021] [0.095] [0.133] [0.128] 
F-stat 7.92 2.05 1.79 17.2 
F statistics for excluded IV 17.21 18.639 7.903 20.606 
Number obs. 29 29 29 29 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided 
alternative.  Robust standard errors are in squared brackets. Other control variables include: subgroup indices 
2006, average income per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, public sector education, average number of telephone per 
1,000 citizens 2006-07, average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens 2006-07 and inequality 2006, dummy 
variables for Red River Delta, South Central Coast and South East regions. F statistics on excluded IV for weak-
instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo 
critical values are the 5 percent significance level critical values for weak instruments tests based on, 
respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size (5.53/16.38). The null hypothesis of weak instrument is 
rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 8. Bounds for the effect of geographic closeness on economic governance 
 
Support interval for  
possible  values of   
95% confidence interval 
 Lower Upper 
  [-0.2, +0.2] 1.33 3.74 
  [-0.4, +0.4] 1.26 3.85 
  [-0.6, +0.6] 1.19 3.95 
Notes: (1) Other control variables include:  provincial competitiveness index 2006, average income per 1,000 
citizens 2006-07, public sector education 2006, average number of telephone per 1,000 citizens 2006-07, 
average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens in 2006-07 and inequality 2006. 
           (2) Bounds are estimated using the approach by Conley et al.(2008) 
           (3) Number of observations: 60  
 
      Table 9. Regional policy diffusion: Bivariate correlation between the institutional 
index 2007 and minimum distance within regions 
 Log minimum distance to main economic centres 
Provinces in Southeast region -0.632 
Provinces in South Central Coast region -0.463 
Provinces in Red River Delta region -0.839* 
*Significant at level 0.05 
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Appendix II. Data sources 
Log Real GDP: Log of provincial real average GDP per capita in 2006-2007 per 1,000 
citizens. Source: GSO (2009)  
Log average foreign direct investmen: Log of provincial average disbursed foreign direct 
investment per 1,000 citizens in 2006-2007. Source: GSO (2009)  
Schooling: Average year of schooling of public sector, calculated from Vietnam Household 
Living Standard Survey 2006. Source: GSO 
Budget transfer: Log average budget transfer per 100,000 citizens in 2006-2007, calculated 
from data at Ministry of Finance, www.mof.gov.vn. 
Inequality: GINI coefficient. Source: Author calculation from Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Survey 2006 
South: Dummy variable for provinces in the south of 17th parallel. Source: Author’s 
calculation 
Log telephone: Log of provincial average telephone per 1,000 citizens in 2006-2007. Source: 
GSO (2009)  
Distance to main economic centers: Distance from centers of each province to nearest main 
trading centers (Hanoi, Danang or HCM) by road. Source: Author’s own calculation.  
Provincial Economic Institutions: Ranking of economic governance in Vietnam’s 63 
provinces by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Vietnam Competitiveness 
Initiative (PCI Survey 2006 and 2008). Data is from the Provincial Competiveness Survey 
available at www.pcivietnam.org 
Entry Costs: A measure of: i) the time it takes a firm to register and acquire land; ii) the time 
to receive all the necessary licenses needed to start a business; iii) the number of licenses 
required to operate a business; and iv) the perceived degree of difficulty to obtain all 
licenses/permits. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Land Access and Security of Tenure: A measure combining two dimensions of the land 
problems confronting entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and the security of tenure 
once land is acquired. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Transparency and Access to Information: A measure of whether firms have access to the 
proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their businesses, whether those 
documents are equitably available, whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms 
and predictably implemented, and the business utility of the provincial webpage. Source: PCI 
Survey 2006 and 2008. 
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Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance: A measure of how much time firms waste on 
bureaucratic compliance, as well as how often and for how long firms must shut their 
operations down for inspections by local regulatory agencies. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 
2008. 
Informal Charges: A measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of an 
obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether payment of those extra 
fees results in expected results or ‘services,’ and whether provincial officials use compliance 
with local regulations to extract rents. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
SOE Bias and Competition Environment: A measure focusing on the perceived bias of 
provincial governments toward state-owned enterprises, equitized firms, and other provincial 
champions in terms of incentives, policy, and access to capital. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 
2008. 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership: A measure of the creativity and cleverness of 
provinces in implementing central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector 
development, and working within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist 
and interpret in favor of local private firms. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Private Sector Development Services: A measure of provincial services for private sector 
trade promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, 
provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological services for firms. 
Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Labor and Training: A measure of the efforts by provincial authorities to promote 
vocational training and skills development for local industries and to assist in the placement 
of local labor. Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Legal Institutions: A measure of the private sector's confidence in provincial legal 
institutions; whether firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for 
dispute resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt official behavior. 
Source: PCI Survey 2006 and 2008. 
Appendix IV. Sample 
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Da Nang, HCMC, Can Tho, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang 
Binh, Quang Tri, TT-Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Dong 
Thap, An Giang, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, Ben Tre, Kien Giang, Tra Vinh, Soc Trang, Bac 
Lieu, Ca Mau, Binh Phuoc, Tay Ninh, Ninh Thuan, Long An, Quang Ninh, Hau Giang, 
BRVT, Bac Ninh, Binh Duong, Binh Thuan, Dong Nai, Ha Nam, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, 
Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Thai Binh, Vinh Phuc, Bac Kan, Bac Giang, Cao Bang, Dak Lak, Dak 
Nong, Dien Bien, Gia Lai, Hoa Binh, Kon Tum. 
  
 
